Top 10 Medical Device Vulnerabilities with Myles Kellerman | Ep. 38

About "Top 10 Medical Device Vulnerabilities with Myles Kellerman | Ep. 38"

"Top 10 Medical Device Vulnerabilities with Myles Kellerman | Ep. 38" is episode 36 of The Med Device Cyber Podcast, published on September 23, 2025, featuring Myles Kellerman (Director of MedTech Cybersecurity). Host Christian Espinosa and the guest dig into the practical realities of shipping and maintaining secure connected medical devices - the kind of detail you only get from people who have done the work.

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Explore the full episode catalog to find more on FDA premarket and postmarket cybersecurity, SBOM management, threat modeling, and medical device penetration testing.

Hi, welcome back to the Med Device Cyber podcast. In today's episode, we're going to go a little bit behind the scenes and talk about the 10 most common and also most dangerous cyber security vulnerabilities we discovered during penetration testing. And these are penetration tests against real world medical devices. One time we found a legacy diagnostic device with a password of admin hard coded in the firmware. And that device was in production use. So imagine the vulnerabilities with that and what somebody could do with that just by guessing the default password. I'm joined today with Myles Kellerman, he's our director of MedTech Cybersecurity. He's one of our lead penetration testers and leads our penetration testing team. And I've also got our CTO and co-host Trevor Slattery. I think Trevor's coming from San Francisco area, Miles is coming from the same area. Both of you in the Bay Area today and I'm in the Phoenix Metropolitan area where it's like 118 degrees. Trevor: It's foggy and cold here right now, so that's crazy. Christian: Cool. So let's uh cover a few of a little bit of the background. Like about penetration testing. Let's just for those of in the audience that don't really understand what penetration testing is and in the context of medical devices, let's just unpack that just a little bit. So there's some context around what we're going to be discussing the rest of the uh podcast episode here. So Trevor, I'll throw it over to you. Uh, what's your best definition of penetration testing in terms of what we're trying to accomplish with medical devices? Trevor: Penetration testing is in its essence trying to simulate what a bad hacker is doing before they can do it. So, if a good guy hacks into a device, they responsibly and ethically tell the manufacturer of the device how they did it so that they can go and fix these problems before it's in the market. It's going to lead to a safer product as opposed to waiting for someone with maybe more malicious intentions to find these vulnerabilities first. So it's kind of an interesting uh, it's an interesting type of testing since it's practically just simulating crime to see what would happen to a system if someone wanted to really abuse it and misuse it. Christian: So we're simulating the bad actors or the malicious software that's propagating a health care delivery organization network typically. Yeah. Go ahead. Trevor: There are a couple of different, I think that pen testing is a little bit of an umbrella of activities looking at different goals. Um, there are all sorts of different types of scanning, sorts of different testing, some are automated, some are manual that go into the process. But it's pretty much just trying to dig up any flaws or poor design decisions for security that are going to introduce risk to a patient or to a health care delivery organization, like you said, like a hospital network or a blood delivery center, something like that. Christian: Okay, I think one of the misconceptions at least that I see periodically with pen testing or penetration testing is many prospects or clients think that we are not going to find anything. Has that ever been the case? I'll defer to you Miles. Have you ever done a penetration test where you did not find anything that needed to be addressed from a cyber security perspective? Myles: Uh, typically not. Um, they there are a lot of variables that go into protecting a uh medical device, uh everything from the supply chain aspect all the way down to the source code. Um so there's always usually something there an area of concern or at the minimum a security recommendation to strengthen the cyber security controls of that medical device. So, Christian: Yeah, and these devices are looked at through a little bit of a different lens from a risk perspective. I mean typically in quote, you know, traditional cyber security, we look at data disclosure. Uh so somebody steals my credit card information or my protected health information. So it's an inconvenience, but in the lens we're looking at the world through with penetration testing and vulnerabilities with medical devices, it's really about patient safety. If somebody hacks into a defibrillator and shocks you to death, it's a little bit more severe than uh your credit card information being stolen. You can recover from your credit card information being stolen, but you can't recover if you die from being shocked to death obviously. So the risk is much greater. Trevor: Getting shocked to death is pretty permanent. And when we're going through the uh risk assessment process, it's very different from that regard. We have to look at how we're blending security and safety, which is completely unique to this industry. And so in security they talk about the CIA triad, confidentiality, integrity, availability. It's going to be relevant in the medical space, but we add the new CIA H quad square. Uh and that H would be for harm. So looking at can we harm an individual? Can we cause direct pain or discomfort to a patient? Can we delay treatment, misdiagnose a disease, something like that. There is a lot that can go wrong with like you said Christian, lasting permanent damage in many cases. Christian: Yeah, and I think about this in real world examples like my grandmother passed away, but when before she passed away, she was hooked up to a drug infusion pump. Uh and as a lot of people are in the hospital and there have been many vulnerabilities with that particular model. And if something like malware was propagating that hospital network and happened to hit that drug infusion pump and increase the the flow rate of a drug she was on, let's say morphine, then she could OD on morphine and actually die, you know, sooner than, you know, she did. So, you know, the risk is pretty great. It's pretty it's pretty close at home as well. So let's jump into the the top 10 here. The top 10 common vulnerabilities we find. Number one I have on the list here is hard-coded or default credentials. and I mentioned a little bit about finding the firmware with the password of admin so we can get into the device firmware at that level. Uh from your experience Miles, do we find this pretty often? Um and what's a couple of the more common findings either, you know, on the device itself, uh the mobile app or the web app because we, you know, typically a medical device has all three of those components, sometimes it doesn't. But what's What are your thoughts on this uh particular vulnerability? Myles: Sure. We we see this uh far too often. Uh whether it's coming downstream from the supplier, uh having default credentials set that are never noticed, uh by the receiving uh client who's trying to put this device out to market or um just totally not setting uh additional security configurations to enforce not having a default password. So we we've seen many uh many examples of this. A lot of times where I see it is in um during static code analysis, uh we will see these passwords hard coded in. Um and then uh with device access as well. when we're physically testing medical devices, we'll find that certain menus are using default passwords uh that are can clearly be looked up um on the internet or just best guess passwords either using like the company name or just as simple as admin admin or password 123. Um and to kind of follow up with that too one of the major major findings uh for physical devices um is or I should say probably with uh any medical device that's using a computer of some kind, um is going to come down to like the BIOS password. Uh that leads to a lot of nasty things that can that can happen down the attack chain. Uh if leaving the the bio's password um not enabled, um, so there's a there's a lot of that would probably be the most impactful uh besides the hard coded password would be BIOS passwords not enabled. Christian: That's hard coded to nothing. Or not enabled. That that's a good that's a good edition there because it's not just hard-coded passwords are easy to guess or documented somewhere or in the source code. It's sometimes there's not even a password set for like the BIOS as an example like you mentioned. And uh something as you're talking came up because uh a lot of medical device device manufacturers outsourced their software development and you're talking about supply chain Miles. So I think this is a critical point because if I've outsourced my software development and I'm and I'm a MedTech innovator, I'm assuming the company of outsourced the development two knows how to do secure software development. From our experience, it's extremely rare. What do you think about that, Trevor? Trevor: It's far too common that we see engineers just developing medical software the way they would develop any other software and there are a few things that can go wrong with this. We've already talked about the fact that medical systems have higher risk than other systems just because we're dealing with patient safety. But moving through regulated industries is much harder than say, you know, I I I know in the past we've talked about the Silicon Valley mindset move fast and break things. I can see look out the window and I see all the signs on the bus stop advertising some weird new AI tool that someone created three weeks ago. And that's great for a lot of industries to just try to make code, get a product out there. But in regulated industries such as healthcare, there are processes that need to be followed. Standards you need to adhere to documentation requirements andbility that is just far too commonly missing. Christian: Yeah, so you're you're suggesting or inferring that uh a software development company in medical device should be following IEC 62304 which advocates for secure software development for medical devices. Trevor: Definitely. And then there's a IEC 81,001-5-1 which talks a little bit more about that total product life cycle and that secure software development. And so both of those standards in combination are great for medical device manufacturers to look at. So if a manu if a uh like an OEM is trying to hire inhouse talent for this development, they should look to stand to developers who understand these standards. or if they're trying to outsource their contracting to a third-party shop, they want to make sure that that development team understands these standards. They're creating documentation that lines up with ISO 13485 so there aren't going to be any road blocks down the line. It's also just assumed that they're going to create more quality code. There's going to be more security baked into their code. They're not going to introduce as much unnecessary risk. Christian: Yeah, so we're advocating with medical devices, it's a regulated industry, so the software development firm should fall IC 62304 versus it's ironic both of you are in the Silicon Valley which you make it sound like the bumper stickers all over the say move fast and break things. I have I seen those all over the place? Trevor: Can't say I've seen those. I did learn a crazy fact though. in San Francisco, there is a startup for every 20 people in the city. Christian: That was probably somebody's startup that came up with those statistics. Trevor: Probably. But just goes to show, people do like to just try to make something. Christian: Cool. Well I guess the follow-up statistic would be how many of those startups actually succeed. right? Trevor: I'd say less than one in 20. Christian: And what defines a startup? A lot of people have an idea. If I have an idea and I tell two people, does that mean I have a startup or do I have to form a corporation? But that's a different topic. So let's go to number two on the top 10 uh vulnerabilities of medical devices, which is unsecured communication channels. and this could be unsecured a number of methods. Uh how do we see this in medical devices typically? I I'll throw it to you want to answer. Myles: Yeah. So uh with this with this particular topic here, we find this a lot. Um, it can come in many a different form, whatever interface you're testing, whether it's Bluetooth, ethernet, um, and even wireless. Uh we're looking at we're trying to look at data flows that are encrypted. Uh so encryption in transit, um, to protect the patient data if there is any uh part of that data flow. And so, uh some of the things we see are no encryption at all for the data in transit. Um, and that includesI or PII being part of those data flows, um, to maybe they're using encryption, but it's maybe a uh, a standard that's no longer supported or has been sunset. So an example that would be uh, something we see all the time is uh, your your encryption cypher suite such as TLS 1.0. Um, I don't I we really don't see too much of uh, um, any of the other weaker encryption, but um, those configurations need to be made to make sure that stronger cypher suites are being used if encryption uh is turned on for those data flows. But uh that that's typically what we see out of these devices um and uh, you know, Christian: Yeah, I know one thing that I've noticed in a couple of devices that we worked on. It wasn't just the type of encryption as how they how they did key management. It was very easy to figure out what the key was. So it doesn't matter how great the encryption is if you don't protect the keys that are used to encrypt the data then you can just decrypt the data even if it's, you know, TLS 1.3. It doesn't matter. Trevor: There's a great standard that the FDA calls out, uh FIP 140-3 which talks about latest and greatest encryption standards and uh they're in the process of trying to sunset FIP 140-2. But this talks about when you can use certain levels of encryption, what those encryption standards are. Uh, this does need to be a little bit of a risk-based approach. If you're just transferring harmless machine data or like startup logs, just diagnostic information relating to the device, nothing sensitive relating to patient safety, nothing that can be used to compromise the system further. Encryption on that information is going to be less important as opposed to transmitting PHI, transmitting diagnostics results, things of that nature. Christian: Yeah, and that bring that brought up a question to my mind or something that topic here, we work with a lot ofable which have, you know, the battery powered. And if we add all this encryption which may not be necessary for what the data you're talking about, which is diagnostic data, then we're draining the battery life of that device much quicker because encryption takes a lot more processing power which therefore drains a battery. So, how do manufacturers find that balance. Trevor: Well, we can use that implantable device example. If you have an implantable device and there's no way to access what information is inside of it without removing the implantable. What is really the risk of someone doing that? Why would you need to encrypt the data at rest in the system. So just understanding where there's that balance. Security has to be a balance. There's functionality and security often clash directly. Um, we always talk about perfect security is nearly impossible. You can't really have any connections, you can't hardly have any code and so it's just going to remove any usefulness of the product. When we have situations like like that where we're very resource constrained, it should come down to what can be accessed and what can't. And if there's something that's inaccessible, we can have some looser controls around it. Christian: Awesome. Let's move to number three. Uh three is uh on my list here's outdated or vulnerable third-party components. And this is where the software bill of materials or the S-Pond comes into play. And I think there's been a big push for this for a long time since Hart Blee came out and even a Shell shock back in the day because a lot of HDOs didn't know the device and even medical device manufacturers didn't know that this medical device even had these vulnerabilities because they didn't understand the third-party components that made up that device. So, can we talk about do we see this quite often like outdated and vulnerable third-party components when we do our S-bom analysis? Myles: Yes, absolutely. Um there the only clients that we see very few findings for, we'll just take uh the S bomb part. Um our clients that are already running tools um for their S bomb to uh you know, track and mitigate the threats that come through with those third party components. Um outside of that, you know, we're finding uh vulnerable components in uh CMD products or web applications and mobile devices as well. Um so it's it's I don't want to say it's uh kind of wack a mole because it kind of is because new vulnerabilities come out for these third-party components um constantly. So, but it's it's a necessity to make sure that these things are constantly tracked throughout the product's life cycle in order to maintain good cyber security hygiene. Christian: Yeah, and that's a very good point because there's a lot of emphasis with manufacturers on getting their the product to market. So they do this as bomb analysis, it's all their vulnerable are are mitigated, it's good to go and it's on the market. But then a new vulnerability could be discovered with one of those third-party components after it's on the market or cleared to be on the market. So that's where that continuous monitoring comes into play as you mentioned, Miles, that post-market management. Cool. We'll go on to number four here. Number four is improper access control. I'll thought over you Trevor, how often do we see this with medical devices? and this could be logical or physical, I guess you could be either one. Trevor: This one is super common. I'll talk to the logical one first. So when we're looking at access control that's the FDA terminology would be authentication. So how are we determining who is authenticated into different levels of permission, different amounts of information, different levels of access. For an example, if we're looking at our email accounts, I shouldn't be able to read Miles's email and Miles shouldn't be able to read my email, but the IT admin for, you know, who's handling Gmail can handle all of our emails in our organization. So, they have different levels of permission and it should be gated appropriately. We see this all too often where one user is able to read another user's information. This can be very dangerous especially if they have PHI involved or one user can say like a general user can access an admin role. Things of that nature are very common in software medical device and I would say it's one of our more common findings on pen test reports. Christian: Cool. What about you Miles? I know you've had pretty good success with breaking into web applications that are part of a medical device uh because of the improper access control. Myles: Absolutely. So there there are many instances that I could go over, but um, it's it's paramount that if there's multiple users, um, let's say in a web application that, you know, the the medical device company needs to make sure they're testing the difference between what the admin or high privilege user can access versus what the low privilege user can access and really do, you know, it comes down to doing the pin tests to figure out uh what that low privilege user can and cannot do? Um, a lot of times I'll find that the low privilege user can use an admin function that it's not intended to be able to use or even see and then that goes into like, uh information disclosure of patient data even. So, um, it can it can really get nasty with uh, you know, not having a proper pen test that checks the access controls. Um, one thing to note on that, uh even we have findings to to simplify it down. Um, you know, for replaying, replaying a web call that access data, um, you know, we've seen it as bad as as deleting the authentication mechanism out of the request such as a cookie. and um, at the simplest form of cookie and replaying that and still getting data back. So, just being totally unexecuted or not even using authentication to even you know, see that valuable data. Christian: Yeah. Awesome. So let's move on to number five here, which is uh, debugg interfaces left enabled. And there's two primary debugg interfaces with medical devices. There's UART, uh, which is we don't see that too often. but there's also J tag. Um, from our experience, I'll I'll throw this one over to you, Trevor. Uh, how often do we see this or is this really a problem or like is it most our most manufactures pretty good atting this one? Trevor: This one is a little bit of a unique problem since it's very easy to mark these ports as out of scope of testing. So, JTag and UART will be a little bit different from say a USB port which is intended to be exposed on the outside. But if we have a Jtag port, UART port, usually that's going to be on uh printed circuit board itself. So that's deeper in the system. If you need to shred apart the plastic on a device, tear it open to access that port, that's going to be evidence enough of compromise. Another thing with these attacks is the attacks are usually generally quite complicated once you do have that level of access, but if they're successful, they can be devastating. You can entirely rewrite the functionality of the device to do whatever you want. You can siphon out any information that the device is capturing to your own controlled endpoint. You can change the way that therapy works. You can remove any safety controls and restrictions. It's essentially the keys to the kingdom if this is successful. Having said that, generally the control is to make all together. The only way is to flash on the firmware during development and then bury it far enough in the device where nobody can touch it. Christian: So, once the device is done being developed and is being pushed to production, wouldn't another control just be to disable these debug interfaces because what's the point of using why do they still need to be enabled if the devices in production? Trevor: They can be used for maintenance so updating the device or you know, the any diagnostics needed. Generally the control would be you can lock uh you can lock one of these ports so you'll need essentially authentication to access anything on the inside, which is going to be an added layer of control. Uh this allows for manufacturers say a device is not operating properly or they need to do an update and they don't have over the air updates enabled. They can take the device back, flash on new firmware, change the functionality without exchaging it to the outside. So that uh Jtag authentication, UR authentication is going to be a great compensating control while still keeping that functionality in place. Christian: Okay. Awesome, let's move to number three. Uh three is uh on my list here's outdated or vulnerable third-party components. and this is where the software bill materials or the Spond comes into play and I think there's been a big push for this for a long time since Hart Blee came out and even Shell shock back in the day because a lot of HDOs didn't know the device and even medical device manufacturers didn't know that this medical device even had these vulnerabilities because they didn't understand the third-party components that made up that device. So, can we talk about do we see this quite often like outdated and vulnerable third-party components when we do our S-m analysis? Myles: Yes, absolutely. Um there the only clients that we see very few findings for, we'll just take uh the S bomb part. Um our clients that are already running tools um for their S bomb to uh you know, track and mitigate the threats that come through with those third-party components. Um outside of that, you know, we're finding uh vulnerable components in uh CMD products or web applications and mobile devices as well. Um so it's it's I don't want to say it's kind of wackmo because it kind of is because new vulnerabilities come out for these third-party components um constantly. So, but it's it's a necessity to make sure that these things are constantly tracked throughout the product's life cycle in order to maintain good cyber security hygiene. Christian: Yeah, that's a very good point because there's a lot of emphasis with manufacturers on getting their the product to market. So they do the S-m analysis, it's all their vulnerable are are mitigated. It's good to go and it's on the market. But then a new vulnerability could be discovered with one of those third-party components after it's on the market or cleared to be on the market. So that's where that continuous monitoring comes into play as you mentioned, Miles, that post-market management. Cool. We're going to number four here. Number four is improper access control. I'll thought over you Trevor, how often do we see this with medical devices. and this could be logical or physical, I guess you could be either one. Trevor: This one is super common. I'll talk to the logical one first. So when we're looking at access control, that's the FDA terminology would be authentication. So how are we determining who is authenticated into different levels of permission, different amounts of information, different levels of access. For an example, if we're looking at our email accounts, I shouldn't be able to read Miles's email and Miles shouldn't be able to read my email. But the IT admin for, you know, who's handling Gmail can handle all of our emails in our organization. So, they have different levels of permission and it should be gated appropriately. We see this all too often where one user is able to read another user's information. This could be very dangerous especially if they have PII involved or one user can say like a general user can access an admin role. Things of that nature are very common in software medical device and I would say it's one of our more common findings on pen test reports. Christian: Cool. What about you Miles? I know you've had pretty good success with breaking into web applications that are part of a medical device uh because of the improper access control. Myles: Absolutely. So there there are many instances that I could go over, but um, it's it's paramount that if there's multiple users, um, let's say in a web application that, you know, the the medical device company needs to make sure they're testing the difference between what the admin or high privilege user can access versus what the low privilege user can access and really do, you know, it comes down to doing the pin tests to figure out uh what that low privilege user can and cannot do? Um, a lot of times I'll find that the low privilege user can use an admin function that it's not intended to be able to use or even see and then that goes into like, uh information disclosure of patient data even. So, um, it can it can really get nasty with uh, you know, not having a proper pen test that checks the access controls. Um, one thing to note on that, uh even we have findings to to simplify it down. Um, you know, for replaying, replaying a web call that access data, um, you know, we've seen it as bad as as delaying the authentication mechanism out of the request such as a cookie. and um, at the simplest form of cookie and replaying that and still getting data back. So, just being totally unsecured or not even using authentication to even you know, see that valuable data. Christian: Yeah. Awesome. So let's move on to number five here, which is uh, debugg interfaces left enabled. And there's two primary debugg interfaces with medical devices. There's UART, uh, which is we don't see that too often. but there's also J tag. Um, from our experience, I'll I'll throw this one over to you, Trevor. Uh, how often do we see this or is this really a problem or like is it most our most manufactures pretty good at getting this one? Trevor: This one is a little bit of a unique problem since it's very easy to mark these ports as out of scope of testing. So, JTag and UART will be a little bit different from say a USB port which is intended to be exposed on the outside. But if we have a Jtag port, UART port, usually that's going to be on uh printed circuit board itself. So that's deeper in the system. If you need to shred apart the plastic on a device, tear it open to access that port, that's going to be evidence enough of compromise. Another thing with these attacks is the attacks are usually generally quite complicated once you do have that level of access, but if they're successful, they can be devastating. You can entirely rewrite the functionality of the device to do whatever you want. You can siphon out any information that the device is capturing to your own controlled endpoint. You can change the way that therapy works. You can remove any safety controls and restrictions. It's essentially the keys to the kingdom if this is successful. Having said that, generally the control is to make all together. The only way is to flash on the firmware during development and then bury it far enough in the device where nobody can touch it. Christian: So, once the device is done being developed and is being pushed to production, wouldn't another control just be to disable these debugg interfaces because what's the point of using why do they still need to be enabled if the devices in production? Trevor: They can be used for maintenance so updating the device or you know, the any diagnostics needed. Generally the control would be you can lock uh you can lock one of these ports so you'll need essentially authentication to access anything on the inside, which is going to be an added layer of control. Uh this allows for manufacturers say a device is not operating properly or they need to do an update and they don't have over the air updates enabled. They can take the device back, flash on new firmware, change the functionality without exposing it to the outside. So that uh Jtag authentication, UR authentication is going to be a great compensating control while still keeping that functionality in place. Christian: Okay. It sounds like that's the authentication is a control as well as perhaps having tamper proof seals that would have to be broken in order to get into the device to to get to the UR or J tag port. Trevor: Exactly, yes. Christian: Cool. Well we'll on to number 10, uh which is no rate limiting or automation controls. And rate limiting means we're limiting the number of actions that can happen or requests that can happen in a specific time frame. Trevor: You have another example for rate limiting? What what are some of the examples that you've experienced? Trevor: We've had a rate limiting is a pretty common finding. Uh, brute forcing attacks are a low-hanging fruit for a lot of uh hackers. And brute forcing is trying to just use a ton of different passwords against a single login or a single uh a single password against a whole bunch of logins and trying to see if they can get a match. Uh, often times what we'll see is that you can have a list of common passwords. There are tons of lists online where it'll be, you know, the top 10,000 most commonly used passwords or 100,000 or million or whatever it is. And if you see that there is rate limiting in control, it'll be the same as when you try to go and you put in your phone password wrong four times, it says you have to cool down for 30 seconds before you can try again. That would be a good example of proper rate limiting. But if we see that we can try our phone password 10,000 times and nothing happens, then we can set up an automation which is what we're doing in these cases. which does these 10,000 attempts in a matter of seconds. So we're able to quickly guess millions of passwords against a single email or login and it's pretty successful. People aren't the best at having good passwords in on their devices and so we're trying to abuse that fact by abusing a device control that is not in place. Christian: Yeah, awesome. Uh we're coming up on time here. We hit the top 10. I think we gave a pretty good decent example for each of them. And I just want to reiterate that all the top 10 we've talked about each of the individual ones that we've given you real examples, it's not theoretical. And one of the ways to prevent some of this, penetration testing is kind of reactive from a proactive perspective if you do what's called a secure product development framework or you have devsec ops, you do secure software development and have a a pipeline in place with certain security checks as you're developing the code that can help prevent a lot of these vulnerabilities. As I mentioned, penetration testing is more reactive and unfortunately when we're called into to do penetration testing, uh we find a lot of vulnerabilities that often result in a lot of extra effort on the manufacturer to fix them versus that they would have enabled a secure product development framework early on. And one of the things to consider uh and there's a big push towards this is the FDA and other regulatory authorities, they don't want your device to be safe most of the time, they want it to be safe all of the time because the risk is super high as we talked about. We're dealing with patient safety. Trevor: You say the surgical robot works most of the time. We're good at transplants most of the time. Don't worry about the rest of the time though. Now, it has to be the risk is so high so the security controls have to be just as high to compensate. There's very little room for error in a lot of these medical devices and we need to make sure that that's considered when we're handling security there. Christian: So, thanks everyone for tuning into the Med Device Cyber podcast. I hope you found this episode on the top 10 vulnerabilities we discover a medical device uh beneficial. If you have any to a medical device penetration test, please feel free to reach out to Blue Goat Cyber. That's what we specialize in along with full service emissions. Thanks and have a great one.