Medical device penetration testing prioritizes system integrity and availability over...
Medical device penetration testing prioritizes system integrity and availability over confidentiality because clinical exploits carry irreversible consequences for patient safety.
Penetration testing extends beyond passive vulnerability scanning by chaining vulnerabilities...
Penetration testing extends beyond passive vulnerability scanning by chaining vulnerabilities together to demonstrate actual clinical harm and worst-case patient impacts.
Penetration testing scopes and attack paths must be driven by an updated
accurate threat model that reflects the device's real-world clinical deployment.
Manufacturers cannot assume hospital networks are safe
devices must be engineered to protect themselves within inherently hostile clinical environments.
Medical device cybersecurity risk calculations must evaluate exploitability and severity of...
Medical device cybersecurity risk calculations must evaluate exploitability and severity of patient harm rather than statistical failure probability.
Episode Summary
In this episode of The Med Device Cyber Podcast, host Christian Espinosa sits down with guest Parker Daudt, an ethical hacker and penetration tester at Blue Goat Cyber, to discuss the critical nuances of medical device penetration testing. Moving from traditional enterprise cybersecurity to product security requires a fundamental shift in mindset: rather than prioritizing data confidentiality and financial impact, medical device teams must focus on system integrity, availability, and patient safety.
Daudt shares frontline insights from testing dozens of medical devices, illustrating how penetration testing goes beyond automated vulnerability scanning to demonstrate real-world clinical impact through chained exploits. The conversation covers often-overlooked attack surfaces—including legacy peripherals like CD drives—and stresses why penetration testing must directly validate an up-to-date threat model rather than relying on stale documentation.
Espinosa and Daudt also analyze FDA expectations regarding hostile clinical deployment environments, explaining why manufacturers cannot rely on hospital network perimeter controls. Crucially, they explore why risk management methodologies must replace traditional statistical probability with exploitability when assessing patient harm. This episode offers essential technical and regulatory guidance for device manufacturers navigating FDA premarket cybersecurity submissions.
Frequently Asked Questions
Quick answers drawn from this episode.
In this episode of The Med Device Cyber Podcast, host Christian Espinosa sits down with guest Parker Daudt, an ethical hacker and penetration tester at Blue Goat Cyber, to discuss the critical nuances of medical device penetration testing.
Medical device penetration testing prioritizes system integrity and availability over confidentiality because clinical exploits carry irreversible consequences for patient safety. Penetration testing extends beyond passive vulnerability scanning by chaining vulnerabilities together to demonstrate actual clinical harm and worst-case patient impacts....
This episode covers Penetration Testing, Threat Modeling, and FDA Premarket Cybersecurity. It's part of The Med Device Cyber Podcast, hosted by Blue Goat Cyber, focused on practical medical device cybersecurity guidance for MedTech teams.
Daudt shares frontline insights from testing dozens of medical devices, illustrating how penetration testing goes beyond automated vulnerability scanning to demonstrate real-world clinical impact through chained exploits. It's most useful for medical device manufacturers, cybersecurity engineers, regulatory affairs professionals, and...
Medical device penetration testing prioritizes system integrity and availability over confidentiality because clinical exploits carry irreversible consequences for patient safety.
Listeners also asked
Quick answers pulled from related episodes.
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Pre-fills with: "Medical device penetration testing prioritizes system integrity and availability over confidentiality because clinical exploits carry irreversible consequences for patient safety."
What makes medical device penetration testing different from traditional cybersecurity? Christian Espinosa is joined by Blue Goat Cyber penetration tester Parker Daudt to explore what ethical hacking looks like when the device being tested can directly affect patient safety. Parker explains how penetration testing pushes beyond vulnerability scanning to uncover the real impact of an exploit, why outdated threat models can leave important attack surfaces untested, and why even something as simple as a CD drive can become a meaningful entry point. They also discuss hospital environments, exploitability, the risks created by large-scale device deployment and why medical device security has to be considered through the lens of the patient, not just the technology. In This Episode: * 01:30 Moving from traditional cybersecurity to patient safety * 05:57 Working with manufacturers on real-world risk * 09:25 Vulnerability scanning versus penetration testing * 11:55 Unexpected medical device attack surfaces * 14:26 Why penetration testing depends on the threat model * 17:38 Why hospitals should be treated as hostile environments * 20:08 Exploitability versus probability * 22:45 Why medical device cyber risk has real-world consequences * 24:50 How one compromised device can create a foothold * 26:16 Is hacking really like the movies? * 29:21 Parker’s biggest takeaway for manufacturers Connect with Parker Daudt: https://www.linkedin.com/in/parkerdaudt/ The Med Device Cyber Podcast is brought to you by Blue Goat Cyber, cybersecurity experts providing essential security solutions for the medical device industry. Learn more: https://bluegoatcyber.com Schedule a Discovery Session: https://go.bluegoatcyber.com/meetings/blue-goat-cyber/discovery-session Christian Espinosa on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/christianespinosa/ Blue Goat Cyber on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/blue-goat-cyber/ Blue Goat Cyber on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/bluegoatcyber/ Blue Goat Cyber on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/bluegoatcyber/ Blue Goat Cyber on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@BlueGoatCyber/?sub_confirmation=1 Download MP3 — full interview
If you've got sepsis and an IVD says you don't, or a surgical robot cuts in the wrong spot and it's performing surgery on your spine, it could potentially paralyze you. So you can't really recover from a lot of the things that we are working on. So the risk is a lot more severe because it's not really an inconvenience. As I've noticed, a lot of more lesser-seen attack surfaces, things like CD drives on just older machines that are getting phased out. So You may be working with a client who has older technology that doesn't really consider the CD drive as a potential attack surface. You deal with the life of whoever is using your device. And so the impact at the end of the day has real-world consequences. It's not something that can just be rolled back. It's not something that can be restored from a backup server. If robot cuts in the wrong spot and you bleed out on the table, there's no coming back from that. Hi, welcome back to another episode of the Med Device Cyber Podcast. Today we're going to be talking about hacking, hacking into medical devices from a penetration testing point of view. We've got one of Blue Goat Cyber's penetration testers, an ethical hacker or white hat hacker. Parker here with us. Uh, he's— I don't know how many devices Parker's worked on, but it's probably a couple dozen at least, maybe more. Uh, so he's been working with medical devices for maybe a year and a half now, hacking into them. And we're going to get some frontline exposure to what it's like to hack into medical devices and what the field is like from Parker's point of view. So welcome to the show, Parker. Thanks a bunch, Christian. Yeah, no problem. Where are you coming from, Parker? I think you're in Somewhere in Oregon, right? Yeah, just outside of Portland. So, get to enjoy some of that nice West Coast, Pacific Northwest weather. What is that weather, rainy all the time? Pretty much. I think it just stopped raining, actually, so. But you get used to it. Well, cool. I'm excited to dive into our conversation. First off, I know Parker, when we brought you on board, you were doing more what I call traditional cybersecurity, which is more about data protection versus patient safety. Maybe you could explain a little bit about what that shift was like for you from going from thinking about it's all about data to thinking about how can this attack harm or kill a patient? What was that like? Yeah, no, that's definitely, I think, one of the biggest things that I noticed that like with traditional pen testing, you're really focused on, you know, the business impact. Financial or reputational harm that like a vulnerability or an exploit might have. And so shifting into like medical devices, you start to really pay attention to it. Like, what level does this hurt? Could, could this hurt somebody? Could this, you know, delay life-saving treatment? Could this just hurt somebody physically, emotionally? It was really, really important to reframe kind of the approach that you take, or that I took, Personally, when looking at things like cross-site scripting, remote code execution, data leakage, it's really important to kind of put your point of view coming at this from the end user who ends up being someone in a hospital, someone in a medical center, rather than, you know, a customer or someone like a bank. Yeah, and this hits home when you think about it. I believe you just became an uncle, is that right? Yeah, but I just became an uncle to my second nephew. Your second nephew. Okay. Okay. So I, I'm really excited, but yeah, it really, I think everybody has a story that they can kind of pull on, um, when it comes to a family member themselves being in a hospital or relying on life-saving treatment or technology. And so, um, I know my nephew had to be in the NICU overnight. Uh, when I was born, I spent a few days in the NICU as well. So it just really hits home when you start to think about the stuff that you get to work on and what at the end of the day it means for somebody who gets to use a product that you've made better, that you've made more secure. Yeah, to me it's more fulfilling than protecting health records or credit card data. I mean, you can recover from those things being stolen, but if you've got sepsis and an IVD says you don't, or a surgical robot cuts in the wrong spot, you know, and it's performing surgery on your spine, it could potentially paralyze you. So you can't really recover from a lot of the things that we are working on. So the risk is a lot more severe because it's not really an inconvenience. And I think one of the confusing aspects a lot of people have is in cybersecurity, there's the C, IA triad, we like to call it, where it's confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The opposite of that is disclosure. I am disclosing some sort of sensitive data. Integrity, I'm altering it in some desire that it wasn't intended to be. And then availability, I have a denial of service or take it offline. Some people like to say the opposite is DAD or dad. With traditional cybersecurity, we tend to focus on confidentiality. With medical devices, we focus on integrity and availability. Would you agree with that statement based on the risks that you've calculated for most of the devices we've worked on? Yeah, I definitely think that's the big— one of the bigger things. Confidentiality, of course, when it comes to like PHI is important. But when you're talking about, like you had mentioned, a surgical robot, a treatment, like a machine, an analyzer that's going to be going over a blood sample, if you can't trust that the information's gonna be accurate, or if that surgical robot's gonna be available when you need it, or it's cutting in the right spot, then that's gonna be more important in the long term versus, you know, a health record or someone knowing what procedure you're undergoing. Yeah, for sure. And I used to do the penetration testing myself back in the day, I like to say. On medical devices. And one of the things we had to look at was a hazard analysis to see, okay, if I can alter the integrity on this device, what is the ultimate harm to the patient? Like if I can cause a misdiagnosis, what is the harm to the patient? Or if I can cause a delay in treatment, that's the availability aspect, what is the harm to the patient? And that's a, a shift for a lot of people. It sounds like you've been able to make that shift. And when we're talking, when you're talking with a lot of our clients about the risk for things you've discovered, what is their reaction? Do they like typically like object, like they don't just, they don't agree with the risk, or like how's that conversation typically go? Yeah, I think most times, I think for a lot of people when they're in working or like considering cybersecurity, they view themselves as the subject matter expert. But when it comes to medical devices and that kind of hazard analysis that we look at, I like to think that the clients themselves are going to be more of the subject matter experts when it comes to their devices. You know, they, they're the ones that are day in, day out building them, building the machine or building the treatment. And so they'll have a better idea of what could happen. What's the worst case scenario if someone were to, you know, alter treatment plan or take the device offline. And so 9 times out of 10, I've noticed that our clients are more than happy to share that information with us. They, at the end of the day, want the same thing as we do to make sure that their device is going to be secure, that it's going to be accurate, and it's going to be available when the time comes that it's needed. So, uh, as part of their submission, you know, they have to have that information. Some companies are building it out right from the very beginning. Some are kind of considering that maybe a little bit later, but at the end of the day, everybody is taking that into account, and that's really good to see. Yeah, that's good to hear. On the sales side, because I still deal with a lot with sales, we periodically have prospects come to us that it's almost like they don't care about cybersecurity. They think it's an inconvenience. They just want to check a box. For the lowest price. And typically those prospects don't end up becoming clients because, you know, we're, we, we're not about just checking a box. We're about actually making sure the device is secure. And some of those prospects kind of indirectly ask us not to look too deep, which, you know, is concerning to me because my wife or somebody I know could be using this product, or this product could be used to help them. And if there's a vulnerability because somebody just wanted to check a box, and that device can be turned into a weapon and harm my wife or something, you know, that, that's, that's not something I really want to be part of. So I'm glad to hear that the prospects that ended up being clients actually seem to care about the security and the safety of their devices. Yeah, no, it's really good to see. I think you can kind of get it, that attitude, a lot in other industries as well. Coming from that more traditional pen testing, I've definitely worked with my fair share of clients who, you know, view security as something that gets bolted on at the end, or it's just, you know, a pen test is a checkbox on a compliance report that needs to be done every year. With the FDA, I do like and appreciate that they are being more thorough in their review submissions. So they look at, you know, the pen tests, they look at the documentation that all of these companies are putting together as part of their packet, and really seeing how these companies are integrating and really integrating security into everything, and not just kind of making sure that it's an afterthought, or preventing it from being an afterthought. Maybe for the listeners of ours that don't know what a penetration test is, 'cause I know it can be a little confusing. Can you unpack what a penetration test is a little bit, and maybe compare and contrast it to a vulnerability scan? Yeah, so vulnerability scanning's definitely more of like a passive scan over a platform or a service. It'll start with just identifying vulnerabilities and put those findings into a report. You don't really get to see what the extent of exploitation has, on any of those identified vulnerabilities. So a pen test takes the vulnerability, vulnerability scan kind of to that next step, and you get to see how far you can push that finding. What happens if somebody actually exploits it and takes real-world attacks that a malicious user may end up doing and just pushing it to its farthest conclusion, documenting all of that, providing kind of the attack path to a development team or the stakeholders and really just showing the true impact of a vulnerability, not just kind of that surface-level identification that you get with a vulnerability scan. Yeah, I like, I like that answer. It's kind of like here in my condo, I have a door over here to my, my left, and it has a lock. Uh, so there's a vulnerability with that lock. You could identify that with like a quote, vulnerability scanner. But if it's a penetration test, you'd actually go through the lock and see what else you can get inside my office here, right? It's like taking it to the next level because we don't know what's behind that door. We know it may be vulnerable, but the penetration test, you know, chains these things together and goes through the door to see what the actual risk is and what can be identified once you go through that vulnerability or exploit that vulnerability. Yeah, and that's, I think, a perfect analogy. Yeah, with the vulnerability scan, you'd know that the door has a lock. You may even know whether it needs a key or, you know, you just turn the handle and the door opens and locks just for show. But with the pen test, you've gotten to get to open the door, walk into the office. You may identify more locks. You may identify open drawers or documents that are just sitting on a desk. You won't know the full extent of what you can find if you're just stopping yourself at that door. What are a couple of the things that, I know before we started recording, you talked about a few things that kind of stand out and differentiate medical device cybersecurity and medical device penetration testing from traditional. Maybe you can expand upon a few of those and we could just have a discussion about them. Yeah, I feel like from my kind of year and a half doing medical devices, I've noticed a lot of more lesser-seen attack surfaces, things like CD drives on just older machines that are getting phased out. So, I mean, you walk into a new office building, new server farm, and you're not gonna really find PCs with CD drives. And you know, you may be working with a client who has older technology, that doesn't really consider the CD drive as a potential attack surface, but kind of coming in, identifying that, and being able to show them, you know, if this is something you have enabled, it's something you have to consider, and the FDA is going to push back on it, which you may not get pushback. And I actually think that's one of the bigger differences with medical pen testing is the pushback that the kind of governing bodies have that a lot of organizations don't seem to face in the more traditional testing. Well, I think the pushback is warranted because it's— a CD is an entry point into that system. So we have to make sure that that entry point is secure. And some CD drives are readable and writable. So what's to say I couldn't put a blank CD in there and copy sensitive data or the algorithm, the intellectual property from the device or anything else. So, or some devices you can reboot and have a boot off the CD to install like an operating system back in the day, you know, by changing the BIOS. So what's to say I couldn't reboot and reinstall something? You know, there's a lot of attack vectors even with a CD, but I think my, my, my vehicle still has a CD player, but I don't think a lot of people have CD players anymore. Yeah, no, that was like you said, you could boot off a CD. That was actually, I was on a pen test engagement not too long ago where that was actually one of the attack vectors. I mean, a lot of people may be more familiar with USBs and booting from those, but yeah, booting from a CD, got to use that. It was really kind of, like I said, unique, but really fun to include and walk through the client and how that attack vector worked. What impact it had, and, you know, they were a little bit surprised. So you mentioned earlier, um, before we started recording about the threat model, maybe you could explain the threat model and how penetration testing ties into that. When it comes to doing a pen test, for me at least, um, the, like, I base my pen test off of the threat model, whether it's something that I'm putting together myself based off of the documents that our clients are providing, or it's something that they're providing to us. I like to base what attacks I'm going to run off of that information. And so really the pen test that you're going to do is only as good as that threat model is. So if you know a threat model was put together at the very beginning of development, that could be, you know, months to years old. The device that's in front of you may be completely different. So if that, you know, that threat model is out of date, your testing is not going to be accurate and it's not going to capture everything. And also kind of not— if you're not threat modeling with the environment in which the device is operating, if that threat model doesn't take that into account, then you're going to be leaving off possible attack surfaces. And what the FDA is looking for with interoperability and how your data moves across a potentially insecure network, again, doesn't capture and won't have a pen test that captures everything that it needs to. Yeah, that's a good point. A lot of people, from my experience in the threat model, assume their product is going into a somewhat secure or controlled environment, such as the operating theater, but the guidance is consider the environment your product is going to into a hostile or unfriendly environment. So it needs to protect itself regardless of where it's deployed. Uh, and that's, that's a hard pill for a lot of people to swallow. Uh, and that's one of the things I noticed on the threat model is they take credit for the environment it's going to be deployed in, but the stance is really you have no control over that environment it's going to be deployed in. The only thing you have control over is your device and the controls you put on your device. Yeah, that's a big thing. Yeah, I think again, from that kind of shift from traditional to medical, I think with traditional, you as the developer kind of have a bit more control in the like environments in which your devices operate. You deploy something as the sysadmin or the IT administrator, you have a lot more say and control over the devices and endpoints on your network. But when you're developing medical technology, you really have to, in more instances than not, design and develop for a wide range of network topographies and deployment. So you can't, necessarily account for everything or hope that the network is going to be the most secure spot that your device sits in. And so yeah, you need to take as many precautions and put in as many safeguards as you can to make sure your device is secure regardless of where— what the network looks like. Yeah, and you have to assume your device is going into that hostile environment. Just about every day on the news and other major healthcare provider is ransomwared or breached. So your medical device is going on those environments that are constantly under fire. And from a penetration testing point of view, I've done a lot of penetration testing of healthcare organizations, clinics, and hospitals, and there hasn't been a single one we weren't able to pretty much get full access to everything. And it's just the nature of a hospital. It's kind of like an airport. People come and go all the time and it's always open. So it's hard to secure it because it's open 24/7. People are visiting patients. Nurses are coming and going. Doctors are coming and going. People leave the doors unlocked sometimes or propped open just because they're in a hurry. Just like any other facility. But this is a facility that's open to the public. You can't like block entry to everybody coming into a hospital typically, because it's kind of like a public area, even though it's not really public. But, you know, I can walk into any hospital today and go sit in the lobby with my laptop and try to wirelessly hack into something, and nobody's going to say anything. I mean, 9 times out of 10, person waiting in the waiting room or sitting in the waiting room should be there. But, and you can't necessarily go up to everybody who has their computer out or even their phone and be like, hey, are you trying to hack our network right now? Yeah, well, the, the trick I used to do is just go in the cafeteria and order some food and sit there on my laptop, uh, you know, with other line, other line of sight for cameras with my, you know, back to the corner and I could see everything and nobody could see my screen. That typically buys you some time. Yeah, that's a double-edged sword. Like you mentioned, it's, it is, but it isn't a public place. Um, people come and go. They have public— oftentimes have public Wi-Fi, which depending if the networks are segmented properly or not, may just easily allow someone to hop into the internal network. Something that comes up quite a bit in pentesting is with medical devices, it's exploitability rather than probability. Why do we use exploitability when when it comes to medical devices instead of probability? Yeah, so we shifted away from using probability in our risk scoring because it kind of goes back to the assumption that hospital networks are— you have to treat them as a malicious environment. So it's not a matter of if your network gets breached, your device is going to be attacked, it's just a matter of when. So we just assume that there's going to be an attack against the device. So probability is always 100%. If we move away from taking that into consideration and move towards the exploitability of a vulnerability, then we get to look at what the impact is when it gets exploited, not if. Yeah, because we're saying probability is good for things like a hardware component within a computer. One out of, one every 10,000 hours is gonna fail. So we know the probability of that component failing based on historical data. Exploitability, we look at how easy is it for someone to exploit something? Do they have to have physical access? Do they have to have remote access, which is easier obviously than physical? But the idea is, if I've got malicious software propagating, it's not probable it's gonna propagate, it's certain it's gonna be on the internet trying to find vulnerable systems. A nation-state actor is gonna look at how easy it is to exploit something. They're not gonna do it every now and then, like, based on probability or statistics. And we've had these attacks against the United States from nation-states attacking medical device manufacturers. So it wasn't a probable thing, it is a thing, like you said, It's not an if, it's a when. And the when is what we have to consider. And how exploitable is it though? And that's one of the factors of calculating risk. For patient safety, it's how exploitable is it and what is the severity of harm to the patient? So if something is remotely accessible, it is way more exploitable because I can sit in my office here in Tempe, Arizona. I can go to Starbucks. I can hack it from the airplane. I can hack it on my cell phone. I can remotely connect this thing in from any country anywhere versus something less exploitable has requirements where I have to physically be at the device to plug something into it. And I think this is the context in terms of risk that people often misunderstand. Yeah, so I think that's the biggest shift, is get looking at it from the medical lens rather than a traditional security lens. You deal with the life of whoever is using your device, and so the impact at the end of the day has real-world consequences. It's not something that can just be rolled back. It's not something that can be restored from a backup server if you know, someone's treatment's delayed, if they're given the wrong dose, if robot cuts in the wrong spot and you bleed out on the table, there's no coming back from that. So at the end of the day, that impact is just ultimately higher than traditional security because it has no fallback if something were to happen. And so targeting it And coming at it from that lens of not if, but when, then you can start building in better safeguards if you just assume that something's gonna happen eventually. Something will happen eventually. I was just talking to somebody, uh, yesterday about the Air Force has this new technology where they have a fighter jet pilot piloted by a human. And then the wingmen, I think it's like 5 or 6, like smaller jets are autonomous and they're controlled by the main jet with a human. So that sounds great and all, but from a staff perspective, you know, if I'm the adversary, I'm going to go after those smaller jets that are supposedly controlled by the bigger jet with a human flying it and use those against the bigger jet and against all the other planes of my enemy. You know, these are, these are things that sound great, but they can always be used against you. Same with medical devices. These technologies like autonomous surgical robots sound great, but they can all be used against you if somebody can get into them. Yeah, I think that's also something that is really unique to medical devices. They often get deployed in large, large numbers. I mean, you might have a million medic— of a single medical device that gets deployed across the globe, increasing a potential attack surface, you know, and a malicious attacker only has to, you know, find one out of a million to be able to start attacking it versus, you know, a locked-down server room in a guarded building. So if you can even make your way into a network that way, or the backend services of a medical device through that attack vector, then you can start to protect other people. There's this concept called a beachhead or foothold. If I can attack one device and compromise it, from there, if that device is already inside, an environment, then I can, from that device, attack other devices, which means I can bypass things like the firewall, uh, you know, perimeter defenses, because I've got basically, uh, an ally that's inside the environment that I've compromised. Yeah, you don't have to compromise an employee. You wouldn't comp— you don't even have to compromise a device that's sitting in your, your target. You could compromise one that you know, is in a much less secure space, 1,000 miles away. Is hacking like the movies, like The Matrix or Mr. Robot? You know, do you feel like you're in the movies when you're doing this penetration testing and hacking? Sometimes I do. I think sometimes, obviously, movies and TV are gonna sensationalize things and push it a little bit further past what's real. But I think more and more, especially like Mr. Robot's a good example, it's really based in like the reality of hacking, while like The Matrix, Hackers, um, I think Sneakers is another popular, um, I think Robert Redford was in Sneakers, wasn't he? Yeah. Um, those were definitely a bit more sensationalized or good, just good entertainment. You think The Matrix is sensationalized? I mean, we're, we're working on— some of our clients have, uh, neurotech and brain-computer interfaces just like that thing in The Matrix where they put it in your head and you learn everything real quickly. We're not that far off. No, we're not that far off. I guess more so just the attacks that the hackers run in those movies or shows can be a little bit removed from reality. Mr. Robot is a good one that has real commands, real tools that people use. But sometimes, I mean, depending on what you get to work on, you can feel like your own little hero of a movie. When you know at the end of the day that you're helping someone who's kind of at a crossroads in their, their life. I mean, maybe they need this treatment to be able to keep living another 10, 15, 20 years, or someone who's just being born, brought into the world, who has their whole life ahead of them, that you can be the reason why they get to have that extra time or be with their family more. Yeah, I, I, I think it's cool to be part of the journey of some of these startups or even larger companies, uh, bringing a product to market that can change somebody's life in a positive way. Like some of the neurotech we worked on can help if you're blind, it can help you see, uh, can help you if you've got epilepsy, have less seizures. You know, these are things that certainly didn't exist even 5 years ago, or even a few years ago. And you know, imagine being blind and having some neurotech that allows you to see for the first time ever in your, you know, in your 50s. It's pretty amazing. Yeah, I know. I think we've seen some that, you know, give people the ability to speak, to move if they're, you know, fully paralyzed. And so it is really incredible that like, You can have that impact on somebody, um, even if you're not the person that, you know, is designing it, you can still bring a little bit to, to that project. What is, um, something that you think is a key takeaway or key lesson from, uh, this discussion between you and I for our listeners? Like something that would, they should take away, a lesson they should learn. Yeah, I think the biggest thing is to always keep in mind the, the person, the human at the other end of your device. If you're the one, if you're a medical manufacturer, you know, at the end of the day, you get to make that impact on somebody that could be a matter of life and death or the extra time that they get to spend with somebody. So just really taking the time to make sure that your threat models are properly built out, that you know the person who may be building their test or reviewing your device really has a full comprehensive picture of what actually gets deployed. And really just making sure that you're always kind of adding security with everything you do. And it's not just something that the afterthought to just kind of cross the road or tick a box. At the end of the day, it really matters and can really make or break someone, would be the difference for somebody. Yeah, I agree. Starting earlier, sooner than later. And then another lesson, something you hit on, is in traditional cybersecurity, we look at the effect to the device. Like, we can make the device unstable or disclose information or take it offline. Which is fine, but it's missing context. Given medical devices, I think risk is important and it has to be calculated in what is the effect to the patient, not so much the device. I mean, that, that's irrelevant without the context. And I think that's one of the differentiators between traditional cybersecurity and medical device cybersecurity. And, um, I will have to, you know, I've, everyone I talked to about penetration testing talks about Mr. Robot. And this one guy I worked with, so he talked about so much that I like decided not to watch it because it was like over the top how much he talked about it. And I don't know why, like, it was a subconscious level. I just decided, okay, I don't want to watch it because he's talked about it so much. Um, but maybe I should go back and revisit it because it sounds like it's fairly realistic. Yeah, it's definitely a good watch. Um, I definitely want to rewatch it here. Um, the story is really good. Like I said, it's really— I feel obviously they push some stuff to make for good TV, but the technical, the jargon, the tools are really reflective of what we get to do. Do you have to wear a hoodie though when you're hacking? No, I don't think I actually have any good hoods. I probably should because it rains a lot, but no, I usually, I luckily get to hack in pretty, pretty comfortable clothes or when I'm on site, you know, look a little bit more professional. Awesome. Well, thanks, Parker, for joining us today and sharing some of your insights with penetration testing. Some of the context between medical device or contrast between medical devices and traditional cybersecurity. Yeah, thanks so much for having me on. For sure. I hope everyone found value in our discussion today, and I hope to see you on the next episode. Talk to you later. Thanks so much.