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    Episode 086 · October 1, 2026 · 16m listen

    The 7 Biggest Misconceptions About Medical Device Cybersecurity | Ep 86

    Key Takeaways

    Any medical device with software and an interface (like a USB port) is a 'cyber device' and...

    Any medical device with software and an interface (like a USB port) is a 'cyber device' and requires cybersecurity, as any access point is a potential attack vector.

    For medical devices, cybersecurity prioritizes patient safety by ensuring the integrity and...

    For medical devices, cybersecurity prioritizes patient safety by ensuring the integrity and availability of the device's function, which is more critical than data confidentiality.

    Cybersecurity is not a one-time task but an iterative process that must be integrated throughout...

    Cybersecurity is not a one-time task but an iterative process that must be integrated throughout the entire device lifecycle, from design to disposal, to be effective and cost-efficient.

    Risk assessment in MedTech should focus on a vulnerability's 'exploitability' (how easy it is to...

    Risk assessment in MedTech should focus on a vulnerability's 'exploitability' (how easy it is to compromise) rather than its 'probability' (the likelihood of it being attacked).

    Obtaining premarket regulatory clearance is a starting gate

    not a finish line; a robust post-market management plan is required to handle security throughout the device's operational life.

    Software developers, who focus on building functional software

    have a different mindset and skillset than cybersecurity professionals, who focus on breaking software through abuse and misuse cases.

    Medical device cybersecurity is a specialized discipline distinct from traditional IT security

    involving unique regulations, risk models (ISO 14971), and a primary objective of ensuring patient safety.

    Episode Summary

    In this episode of The Med Device Cyber Podcast, host Christian Espinosa addresses the seven most common and persistent misconceptions about medical device cybersecurity. He explains that despite awareness efforts, these misunderstandings continue to pose significant risks in the MedTech industry. The episode is an updated and expanded version of a previous list, reflecting the ongoing challenges and the slow evolution of cybersecurity understanding among manufacturers, investors, and even some developers. Espinosa systematically debunks each misconception, providing clear explanations and real-world context to highlight the unique demands of securing devices where patient safety is the paramount concern. The first misconception discussed is the belief that a device isn't a "cyber device" if it doesn't connect directly to the internet. Espinosa counters this by defining a cyber device as anything with software and any potential entry point, including USB ports used for maintenance. The focus, he argues, should be on any way an attacker could access the software. Next, he tackles the idea that cybersecurity is solely about data protection. He stresses that in MedTech, the primary focus is on patient safety, which translates to ensuring the integrity and availability of a device's function, with data confidentiality being a secondary concern. The third point is that cybersecurity is not a point-in-time study or a final check before submission. Instead, it must be an iterative process integrated throughout the entire product lifecycle, from design to disposal, a concept often referred to as "cradle-to-grave" security. Retrofitting security is costly, inefficient, and delays time-to-market. He then differentiates between probability and exploitability, explaining that risk assessment for medical devices must prioritize how easily a vulnerability can be exploited, rather than the statistical likelihood of an attack. A determined attacker's actions are not governed by probability. Espinosa also clarifies that a premarket regulatory clearance is not the finish line. Manufacturers must have a robust postmarket management plan, as their responsibilities continue long after the device is sold, and hospital requirements may exceed those of the FDA. The final two misconceptions are that software developers inherently understand cybersecurity and that all cybersecurity is the same. He distinguishes the developer's role of building functional software from the security expert's role of identifying abuse and misuse cases. Furthermore, he emphasizes that medical device cybersecurity is a highly specialized, regulated field with different frameworks, risk models (like ISO 14971), and a core focus on patient safety, setting it apart from traditional IT security.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Quick answers drawn from this episode.

    • In this episode of The Med Device Cyber Podcast, host Christian Espinosa addresses the seven most common and persistent misconceptions about medical device cybersecurity. He explains that despite awareness efforts, these misunderstandings continue to pose significant risks in the MedTech industry.

    • Any medical device with software and an interface (like a USB port) is a 'cyber device' and requires cybersecurity, as any access point is a potential attack vector. For medical devices, cybersecurity prioritizes patient safety by ensuring the integrity and availability of the device's function, which is more critical than data confidentiality....

    • The episode is an updated and expanded version of a previous list, reflecting the ongoing challenges and the slow evolution of cybersecurity understanding among manufacturers, investors, and even some developers. It's most useful for medical device manufacturers, cybersecurity engineers, regulatory affairs professionals, and MedTech...

    • Any medical device with software and an interface (like a USB port) is a 'cyber device' and requires cybersecurity, as any access point is a potential attack vector.

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    Show original episode notes
    Medical device cybersecurity is still surrounded by some persistent misconceptions. In this solo episode, Christian Espinosa breaks down seven of the most common misunderstandings he continues to hear across MedTech, from what actually makes a device “cyber” to why cybersecurity cannot be treated as a final-stage compliance task. He also explains why medical device cybersecurity is fundamentally different from traditional IT security, and why getting these basics wrong can create problems long before a product reaches the market. In this episode: 00:07 What actually makes a medical device “cyber”? 02:12 Why medical device cybersecurity is about patient safety 05:21 Why cybersecurity cannot be a point-in-time exercise 06:27 Exploitability versus probability 08:30 Why pre-market clearance is not the finish line 10:43 Why software developers are not cybersecurity experts 11:47 Why traditional cybersecurity is different from medical device cybersecurity The Med Device Cyber Podcast is brought to you by Blue Goat Cyber, cybersecurity experts providing essential security solutions for the medical device industry. Learn more about Blue Goat Cyber: https://bluegoatcyber.com Schedule a Discovery Session: https://go.bluegoatcyber.com/meetings/blue-goat-cyber/discovery-session Christian Espinosa on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/christianespinosa/ Blue Goat Cyber on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/blue-goat-cyber/ Blue Goat Cyber on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/bluegoatcyber/ Blue Goat Cyber on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/bluegoatcyber/ Blue Goat Cyber on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@BlueGoatCyber/?sub_confirmation=1 Download MP3 — full interview
    Christian: Hi, welcome back to another episode of the Med Device Cyber Podcast. I'm your host Christian Espinosa. And today we're going to talk about the top seven common misconceptions about medical device cybersecurity. Christian: Quite some time ago, we did an episode of the top five. I've evolved these to the top seven. The top five are still applicable, they're in this top seven list, but I've added a couple to the list. Christian: These are still applicable today. I think when I recorded this before, the top five was maybe probably almost a year and a half ago. So the list hasn't evolved unfortunately. We've been trying to raise the awareness and trying to help us evolve. It just takes time and persistence. Christian: So number one on the list is about cyber devices. It is still a question that comes up all the time with our prospects, people we get on sales calls with, people I meet at events, they will say I don't have a cyber device. I don't need cybersecurity. Christian: I will ask them a couple questions. Does your device have software? Yes. Most devices in medtech have software. Does it have any way to connect to it? And the answer is no. I'm like, does it have a USB port? They're like, yeah, but it's only used for maintenance, or it's only used to offload images to transfer to the PACS system. Christian: Well, that is a cyber device. And I think the biggest thing that trips people up here is the FDA calls it the ability to connect to the internet. This is what trips people up. I think it should be rephrased to any way an attacker can get access to the software. Any entry point or access point or way an attacker can get into the software. So when you explain it in that terms, it's a little bit clearer because an attacker can use RFID to do something malicious. They can use NFC, they can use magnetic coils, which NFC is a part of. They can use a wireless protocol like MedRadio or BLE or Wi Fi. They can connect to a USB port, maybe a specific type of serial port. It doesn't matter, but these are all ways somebody can get access to the software and alter the software. Christian: If you have software and a means somebody can access that software, then your device is a cyber device and an attacker could potentially alter the integrity or the availability of your software, which can harm or kill a patient. Christian: The second one on my list here, data protection. I still hear this daily. I've had investors that invest in medtech argue with me about this. I have one investor tell me that she has cybersecurity friends that work at Google and Microsoft and cybersecurity is only about protecting data. And I found it interesting that she invests in medtech and that is her perspective. Christian: Because cybersecurity in medtech and in medical devices, it's about patient safety. Data is secondary. It's almost irrelevant. You can recover from your PHI, your health records, your sensitive data being stolen. You can't recover from somebody wirelessly connected to your implantable defibrillator that has a vulnerability, and through that vulnerability, they're able to wirelessly and remotely administer a shock. You can't recover from that so much, especially if you die. Christian: And that's what we have to look at. Like what is the impact to a patient? And I still think this is something that has been slow to evolve. I get it. Cybersecurity evolved from information security back in the day, it was about data protection. Now it's about what kinetic activity can we cause in terms of harm to a patient. And this is more drastically evolving when we look at surgical robots, autonomous surgical robots, AI-enabled surgical robots, robots that can perform surgery on your knee and your spine. And what if this cuts in the wrong spot? What if the endoscope that also has a tissue removal part of it removes the wrong tissue because the integrity of the camera was altered? You know, this is the what we have to look at. Christian: In terms of patient safety versus data protection, with data protection, we're generally concerned about confidentiality, keeping secrets secret, protecting our credit card information or sensitive data. We're not so concerned about confidentiality with medical devices, we're concerned about integrity and availability. If I'm able to alter the integrity of this device and say somebody doesn't have sepsis when they do, or they don't have cancer when they do, or whatever the diagnosis is, then I can affect that patient. If I can alter the availability of the device, like take all the patient monitoring systems offline that are in an ICU, then I can alter the clinical workflow and disrupt the clinical workflow and put patient lives in jeopardy. So we're looking at primarily integrity and availability when it comes to patients and the CIA triad from a cybersecurity perspective. Traditional cybersecurity looks at data protection and confidentiality. Christian: Number three is a lot of people think cybersecurity is a point in time study, something that they do a couple months or a few months before pre-market submission or something they do later on the roadmap. Cybersecurity is like on the roadmap towards the end. The problem with this is it is super expensive and frustrating to try to retroactively add cybersecurity to something that it wasn't designed into. This is like building your house without the rebar, and then you realize there's no rebar, my foundation is unstable. So now you have to tear the house apart, put the rebar in, and now the house is stable, but it's very costly. There's a lot of rework. It delayed your time to market and it frustrated everybody. Christian: Cybersecurity should be done from design to disposal or cradle to grave, a lot of people like to say, not as a point in time study. This comes up all the time at events. People will ask them about cybersecurity and they say, oh, we don't need cybersecurity yet. And I know they have a cyber device. And I I say, well, when do you need it? They say, oh, maybe when we're done with the software development. Well, now you've developed software without cybersecurity controls into it, and you're going to have to try to bolt it on later. Cybersecurity is iterative, not a point in time endeavor. Christian: The fourth one I got on the list here, probability versus exploitability. When we talk about cybersecurity and medical devices, we don't use probability or likelihood. We use exploitability. And we try to make exploitability objective by using CVSS base metrics. This makes it as objective as possible versus subjective. Christian: The reason is, probability is very good for like components in a device. After 10,000 hours, one of them may fail. That's probabilistic, probabilistic, but with an attacker or a malicious actor or malware that's propagating the internet or a nation state, what affects their ability to compromise a medical device is exploitability. How easy is it to exploit? It's not probability. If they have a motive and a means, the next thing is how easy it is to exploit it. Christian: And this is where things like, do I require user-level access to the device? Is the device physically isolated where I have to physically get access to it to exploit it? That is more difficult to exploit than something that is remotely accessible and everybody can connect to it from anywhere and 24-7 try to exploit it. So exploitability needs to be looked at instead of probability. And this is a big paradigm shift for a lot of people when it comes to risk assessment. Christian: The next one on my top seven list here, pre-market package is the finish line. So if I get FDA clearance or PMDA clearance or HSA, it doesn't matter, then I'm done. I'm good to go from a cybersecurity perspective. Not true for a couple of reasons. Number one, that is just a gate to show you've done your due diligence on your device from a regulatory body like the FDA. They say, okay, this device is secure from our standards in our assessment. Christian: Now, when you're deploying your device or selling it, once it's on the market, to a healthcare delivery organization, they may have more stringent requirements than the FDA in the United States, as an example. And if you didn't reverse engineer those requirements, now you're in a position where you have to may maybe redo a lot of the work you already did on your device. So it's important to look at where we plan to sell our device, who is our typical client going to be, and what sort of cybersecurity requirements do they have because these requirements may exceed what the FDA wants. And it's very hard to retroactively bolt on things or add cybersecurity requirements to something that is already finished. It's better to design it in to the product as we talked about. Christian: The other aspect of our clearance is the finish line is post-market management. Part of the pre-market submission package is your plan to manage the device once it is sold and on the market and at a healthcare delivery organization. So what happens when there's a vulnerability in your software bill of materials? What happens if somebody can figure out how to hack into your device? How do you deploy a patch? Who gets notified? Where are all of your devices deployed? Do you even know where they're deployed? Do you have to send a field technician to every device to update it via a USB thumb drive? Can you push an update remotely? What is the infrastructure to support all that? Once the device is cleared, the pre-market portion, the other aspects, who are we going to sell it to and how are you going to manage it are vitally important, and these should be thought about sooner than later before your device is cleared. Christian: The next one on my list here, software developers understand cybersecurity. Software developers will always tell you they know cybersecurity. And they do know some about it, but their skill set is to create software, to test use cases, to make sure the software is functional. It's pretty. It meets all the requirements. That is the software developer's job. And it's a difficult job because they're always under pressure, requirements evolve, people don't know the requirements half the time. That is their job, which is very different from a penetration tester or a cybersecurity professional's job, which is to look at the software from a different lens. Not a use case perspective. We look at it from an abuse case perspective. Christian: How can we abuse the software and get it to do something it wasn't intended to do? How can we misuse the software? How can we break the software? The software developers look at building software. We look at breaking the software and it's a different lens looking through, looking at the software through. So when a software development team tells you they know cybersecurity, I would take it with a grain of salt and hire someone like Blue Goat Cyber just to just to check. Maybe they do know cybersecurity, but from my experience, I would say 1% of software developers actually know cybersecurity to the degree they claim they do. Christian: The next one on the list is cybersecurity equals cybersecurity. What does that mean? Cybersecurity is the same across the board. It's not. This is sort of like the argument versus data about data protection versus patient safety. Totally different. It's totally different with medical device cybersecurity because it is about patient safety. It's a regulated industry. We have to calculate risk differently. We look at integrity and availability. We have to use two different risk matrices. We use AAMI TIR96 and ISO 14971. We have to have rigor. We have to have traceability. We have to trace the penetration test back to the threat model. We have to calculate risk based on a hazard analysis. Do risk based on context. Christian: Like what is the risk to the patient based on what this device does. That largely is not applicable to traditional cybersecurity. And unfortunately, we have a lot of prospects, when I say prospects, it's someone that's looking at us to consider us to provide services for them. We have a lot of prospects that chose a traditional cybersecurity firm to do their medical device penetration testing or risk assessment, and that traditional cybersecurity firm applied traditional cybersecurity methodologies and risk to the medical device, and they got a deficiency letter from the FDA because the context is missing, the traceability of the threat model is missing. The standards that should be followed are missing. So they're not the same, and I hope people listening, you know, you may be able to save a few thousand dollars by picking a traditional cybersecurity vendor to do your testing or assessment, but you'll probably spend way more than that when you have to get it done right by somebody that knows what they're doing in medical device cybersecurity, in a regulated space, which is very different than testing applications on the cloud and seeing if confidential data can be leaked. Christian: So that was my top seven misconceptions. I went over what is a cyber device. People like to argue they don't have a cyber device, but again, anything with software and any way an attacker can connect to that software, get access to the software. Cybersecurity is about patient safety, not data protection. Cybersecurity should be done iteratively from design to disposal, not a point in time study. Cybersecurity should be based on exploitability, not probability. A determined hacker isn't going to roll the dice and decide one day they're going to attack or not and have a play the odds of probability. They're going to try to attack and the exploitability is the area we need to be looking at. The other one is the pre-market is the finish line. It's a gate. We have to consider the healthcare delivery organization or our client that's going to buy our device and their cybersecurity requirements, and we have to have a plan and actually implement the plan for post-market management. So once your device is fielded, how do you make sure it stays secure? And what is the search behind that? The other one was our software developers understand cybersecurity. Software developers know how to build things. Cybersecurity experts know how to break things. Software developers know how to test use cases. Cybersecurity experts look at abuse and misuse cases. And the last one is cybersecurity equals cybersecurity. Traditional cybersecurity is not the same as medical device cybersecurity, drastically different. Traditional focuses on confidentiality, and very different frameworks. Medical device cybersecurity focuses on patient safety with very specific frameworks that are required. Christian: So that's the list of my top seven misconceptions. If you have any other misconceptions, feel free to leave a comment or reach out to us. I hope you found value in these top seven. Maybe I'll do another episode later on when I evolve this to the top eight or top 10. And hopefully a couple of these will drop off because they won't be that common anymore, but based on the past year or so, I suspect not. So thanks for tuning in. I hope to see you on the next episode. I appreciate all of our listeners and hope you found value in this one.

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